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Pre-Disaster Planning and Post-Disaster Aid: Examining the 
Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake 
Matthew A. Cole1, Robert J R Elliott1, Toshihiro Okubo2, Eric Strobl3 
1University of Birmingham, UK 
2Keio University, Japan 
3 Ecole Polytechnique, France 
 
Abstract: 
In this paper we examine the extent to which pre-disaster planning and post-disaster aid can help 
firms recover from the negative impact of a natural disaster.  Using detailed plant-level data 
covering the areas affected by the March 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami we find 
that the number of stopped days of operation was negatively impacted by the disaster although we 
find that only the tsumani-affected plants experienced reduced sales six months after the earthquake.  
However, we do find evidence to suggest that post-disaster sales was influenced by a number of pre 
and post-disaster policies.  More specifically, we find that pre-disaster policies such as having 
alternative transport arrangements and a diversified supplier network positively affect post-disaster 
sales.  We also find that post-disaster aid from local banks and trading partners positively 
influences post-disaster sales but that direct cash payments from government appears to have no 
statistically significant effect. 
 
Keywords: Natural disaster, firms, Japan, earthquake 
JEL codes: Q54, R5, R10, R12, D22, L10, L25, M13, C01 
 
1. Introduction 
As the world economy continues to grow and an increasing proportion of the population lives in 
cities and urban areas it is important to understand how economic resilience to natural disasters can 
be influenced by the actions of firms and governments.  The risks associated with a changing 
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climate and a range of geo-hazards from earthquakes to extreme weather events such as typhoons, 
floods, and rising sea levels will present significant challenges to countries and cities.  It is 
important, therefore, that governments are able to design and implement policies to mitigate against 
the negative impact of natural disasters to enable their economies to cope with current and future 
geo-hazards some of which are predicted to increase in frequency and magnitude.  With continued 
agglomeration of economic activity in urban conurbations, obtaining a clear understanding of how 
countries, firms and people are able to adapt to current and future environmental and geo-hazard 
risk is of importance to both academics and policymakers.1 
In this paper we use detailed plant-level surveys to examine the short term impact of the Great East 
Japan earthquake of 2011 on the performance of manufacturing plants.  The Great East Japan 
earthquake struck off the Pacific coast of Tohoku at 14.46 (JST) on Friday 11 March 2011 with a 
magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale.  The earthquake also triggered tsunami waves that reached a 
height of over 40 metres and travelled up to 10 km inland.2  In terms of output, the short term 
economic impact of the earthquake was significant with manufacturing production falling 
approximately 40% in the immediate Tohoku region before slowly recovering to pre-earthquake 
levels over the next 12-18 months.3  While at an aggregate level the economy appeared to recover, 
at the plant-level the situation was mixed with post-earthquake performance depending on a number 
of factors, including the degree to which the plant was damaged by the earthquake.  The focus of 
this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of two specific factors thought to have influenced the 
post-earthquake performance of plants; these are whether plants had undertaken pre-disaster 
planning and whether or not a plant received post-earthquake aid. 
                                                          
1
 Chang et al. (2012) discuss the trade-offs between increased risk due to increased urbanization and the offsetting effect 
of improvements in building codes and emergency planning.  See US ISDR (2005) for a broader discussion of how to 
build the resilience of countries and communities to natural disasters. 
2 According to a Japanese National Police Report the numbers of people killed, injured or missing was 15,891, 6,152 
and 2,584 respectively (National Police Report 2015).  The same report states that 127,290 building totally collapsed, 
272,788 buildings half collapsed and another 747,989 buildings were partially damaged.  There was also extensive 
damage to roads, railways and infrastructure.  For example, fifteen ports were located in the disaster zone and suffered 
some damage alongside an estimated 10% of Japan’s fishing fleet (Fukada 2011).  The tsunami also caused meltdowns 
at three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.  Residents within a 20km radius were 
subsequently evacuated.  Total insured losses from the earthquake alone were estimated to be between US$14.5 and 
US$34.6 billion (Hennessy-Fiske 2011) whilst the World Bank estimated total damages to be in the region of US$235 
billion.  In the immediate aftermath of the disaster the Bank of Japan offered US183 billion to help stabilise the 
banking system and restore normal market conditions (Uranaka and Kwon 2011).  See Higuchi et al. (2012) and Mimura 
(2011) for further damage estimates from the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami. 
3 Source Japanese Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/iip/index.html  
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An important attribute of earthquakes relevant to our study is that they are inherently local 
phenomena. As such, although the damage from an earthquake may be spatially extensive, there is 
considerable heterogeneity across the affected areas.  This arises both because the characteristics of 
the earthquake itself physically differ across space, but also because exposure in terms of buildings 
and the distribution of the population is likely to be spatially heterogeneous.  Thus, any sort of 
reliable assessment of the damage caused by an earthquake and hence the allocation of pre and 
post-quake aid needs ideally to take place at the most disaggregated level possible.4 
There are a small number of papers that are now beginning to use plant-level data in analyses of 
natural disasters.  For example, Craioveanu and Terrell (2010) consider the impact of storms on 
firm survival following Hurricane Katrina while De Mel et al. (2011) conduct a post-disaster field 
study of surviving enterprises in Sri Lanka following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.  Dahlhamer 
and Tierney (1998) examined the 1994 Northridge earthquake and found damage and financial 
health affected the strength of business recovery.  More recently for Japan, Hosono et al. (2012) 
study the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ capital investment using the Kobe earthquake as 
an exogenous shock, while Cole et al. (2015) examine the impact of the Kobe earthquake on firm 
survival and performance using detailed building damage measures.  In a third Kobe earthquake 
study Tanaka (2015) examines the short-term economic impact of the quake assuming that all plants 
within Kobe suffered the same damage and finds that the earthquake had a significant short term 
impact on value added and employment.  Finally, Todo et al. (2015) examine the impact of the 
Great East Japan Earthquake on supply chain networks using similar data to ourselves.  They find 
that extensive supply chains can negatively affect recovery through the higher probability of network 
disruption but positively through the support network of partners both within Japan and overseas, 
resulting in an overall positive effect.  Of relevance for our paper are recent papers by Uchinda et 
al. (2014) and Uchinda et al. (2015) who examine the relationship between the Tohoko earthquake 
and bankruptcy.  The most important finding is that they find that damaged firms inside the 
                                                          
4
 Existing studies in the natural disaster literature have tended to take a cross-country macroeconomic approach to 
examine the relationship between country level growth and natural disaster events (e.g. Loayza et al. 2009, Hallegatte and 
Dumas 2009, Noy 2009 and Strobl 2012, Kahn, 2005, McDermott et al. 2014) while Yamamura (2010) uses regional data 
to examine the role played by natural capital in both preventing and limiting the damage from natural disasters.  The 
lack of a consensus on the average effects of natural disasters can be seen in Cuaresma et al. (2008) and Cavallo and Noy 
(2010) who argue that on average natural disasters have a positive and negative impact, respectively.  Felbermayr and 
Gröshel (2013) provide a review of the literature.  A recent exception uses the labour force survey for Italy and finds a 
small but significant reduced probability of participating in the labour market for nine months following the L’Aquila 
earthquake with a sharp fall in the first quarter and steady increases for the following 4 quarters. 
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earthquake region are less likely to go bankrupt than undamaged firms indicating 
(counter-intuitively) that earthquake damage lowers the probability of firm exit.  They also find a 
lower probability of bankruptcy for firms inside the earthquake region compared to those outside 
the region.  They argue, but do not show, that this reduction in plant failure was due to the public 
and private aid provided to firms in the area of the earthquake.  Finally, also for the Great East 
Japan Earthquake, Wakasugi and Tanaka (2013) examine the determinants of plant stoppages, 
including descriptive evidence of how stoppages vary across plants.5 
However, despite the increase in the number of plant-level studies to the best of our knowledge 
there has been almost no research that examines the impact of pre-disaster planning and 
post-disaster aid on plant recovery.  The contribution of this paper is thus as follows.  First, we 
complement the previous research of Todo et al. (2014) and Cole et al. (2015) to provide one of the 
first studies of the impact of a natural disaster on plant-level performance.  Second, as far as we 
know we are the first to examine the extent to which pre-disaster planning by plants can affect 
post-disaster plant performance by using a unique plant-level survey that enables us to distinguish 
between earthquake damage and tsunami damage and to examine the extent to which a variety of 
pre-disaster policies benefit post-disaster economic performance.  Policies included in our analysis 
are: arranging alternative transportation methods in the event of an earthquake; arranging alternative 
production arrangements with other firms to enable current orders to be fulfilled; possessing a 
business continuity plan (BCP); and deliberately diversifying parts suppliers to minimise potential 
disruption to the supply chain.  Finally, we are one of the first studies to examine the effectiveness 
of post-disaster aid on post-disaster plant performance and to distinguish between different types of 
aid.6 
To briefly summarise out results, we find that both earthquake and tsunami damage affected the 
duration for which operations were disrupted following the earthquake, but that only tsunami 
                                                          
5
 Tokui et al. (2012) estimate that 90% of output losses was due to supply chain disruption and not as a direct effect of 
damage to individual plants.  Carvalho et al. (2016) investigate the disruption of supply chain more in details, using firm 
transaction data (TSR data) while Henriet et al. (2011) examine firm-network characteristics and their relationship with 
resilience to nature disasters. Umezawa (2014) comments on the impact of the earthquake on the local labour market 
and notes that the manufacturing sector experienced labour shortages because few workers returned to work (whilst the 
construction sector also experienced a very tight labour market). 
6
 Fukanuma et al. (2013) measures the economic impact of the special lending program for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) by the Development Bank of Japan.  Using a questionnaire, they find that the special lending 
program for SMEs reduced the negative economic impact of the earthquake. 
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damage was a statistically significant and negative determinant of sales for the 6 months following 
the earthquake.  In terms of pre-disaster planning, we find that possessing a transport substitution 
policy, a BCP and a production substitution policy that allows other firms to fulfil existing orders are 
beneficial for post-disaster performance in terms of sales.  In terms of post-disaster aid, we find 
that plants that received aid from banks and from trading partners experienced higher 
post-earthquake sales than those that did not.  However, other forms of aid were found to have no 
statistically significant effect on post-earthquake sales.  Finally, similarly to Todo et al. (2015), we 
find that having overseas affiliates can have a beneficial effect on post-quake performance. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses and examines the data 
used in this study and Section 3 outlines our methodology.  Section 4 provides our econometric 
results and Section 5 Concludes. 
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1 Data 
The main source of data for our analysis is the plant-level survey “Questionnaire Survey on 
Damages to Companies Caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake” conducted by the Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 7  The survey targeted a total of 6,033 
manufacturing plants with five workers or more that were located in the prefectures formally 
defined as being impacted by the earthquake.8  The prefectures were Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Tochigi and Ibaraki.  The survey was mailed to plants during the month of January 
2012 with responses requested by February 2012.  Plants were also telephoned to encourage a 
response.  The result of the data collection exercise was a total of 2,117 useable responses 
representing a response rate of 35%.9 
                                                          
7 Hamaguchi (2013) provides an overview the survey data and includes a detailed analysis of each question in the survey 
and a complete set of basic statistics.  For this reason we do not provide a detailed set of data descriptives. 
8 Firms were chosen according to the Law on Special Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction Areas.  Plants 
within the exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were excluded from the survey. 
9
 Although the survey was undertaken in February 2012 the vast majority of aid was received by firms before September 
2011.  This means the majority of aid had already been distributed to the affected plants. 
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As part of the RIETI survey, plants were required to categorise the degree of earthquake and 
tsunami damage that they sustained, to provide information on any pre-earthquake planning policies 
that were in place and to indicate whether they received post-earthquake aid and, if so, of what type.  
Plants were also asked to provide information on a number of plant characteristics such as total sales 
during the pre-earthquake period April to September 2010 and the post-earthquake period April to 
September 2011.  We also utilise a dataset that records the trading partners for each plant from 
Tokyo Shoko Research (“Kigyou Soukan Fairu”) which is a large corporate research company in 
Japan.  After merging these datasets and removing plants that were missing certain key variables we 
were left with 1,283 plants.  Table A1 provides definitions of the variables within our dataset.10 
 
2.2 Plant Damage 
The RIETI survey required plants to categorise their damage levels into one of 4 categories, 
separately for both earthquake damage and tsunami damage.  The four categories correspond to no 
damage, minor damage, more severe partial damage and major damage.  For convenience, for the 
remainder of the paper we categorise these damage types into no, minor, medium and major 
damage. 11   Table 1 provides the number and percentage of plants within our sample that 
experienced each damage type.  Starting with earthquake damage we see that 366 plants, or 28.6% 
of the sample, experienced no earthquake damage, 811 plants, or 63.2% of our sample, experienced 
minor earthquake damage, while 6.69% and 1.55% of our sample experienced medium and major 
damage, respectively.  With regard to tsunami damage, the vast majority (94.3%) of our sample 
experienced no tsunami damage due to their inland locations, while 1.2% of the sample experienced 
minor and medium damage and 3.4% of the sample experienced major tsunami damage. 
 
                                                          
10 While we cannot compare the characteristics of firms in our sample with those of firms in the wider economy we can 
make a limited comparison between firms in our full sample (n=2,117) and firms in our useable sample (n=1,283).  In 
the full sample average pre-quake sales are 80,782 (in 10,000 Yen) compared to 96,406 (in 10,000 Yen) in our useable 
sample.  This indicates that firms in our useable sample are, on average, slightly larger than those in our full sample and 
hence our results may be more applicable to larger firms. 
11 The extended definitions are: Major damage: factories (buildings, production machines and equipment) are totally 
collapsed and cannot operate any production processes (operations are stopped).  Partial damage: factories are partially 
collapsed (half-destroyed) and cannot operate some parts of the production process.  Minor damage: factories are 
partially collapsed and there is only a small negative impact on operations. 
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To obtain a better understanding of the geographical location of plants prior to the earthquake 
Figure 1 provides a map of Northern Japan with each plant in our sample represented by a black dot.  
The coloured shading shows the degree of peak ground acceleration which is a measure of the 
intensity of the earthquake with darker areas representing the greatest intensity.  Finally, the blue 
shaded area along the coast shows the extent of tsunami flooding.  In Figure 2 we enlarge a key 
section of Figure 1 to better illustrate the shading and details which explains why only a small 
percentage of firms reported tsunami damage. 
As a final descriptive exercise, in Table 2 we show the composition of our sample in terms of 
industrial sectors.  In terms of the composition of our sample, 12.9% of plants are from the 
Fabricated Metals industry, 12.8% are from the Food industry, 10.4% are from Misc. equipment and 
8.9% from Electical machinery.  The rest are fairly evenly distributed over the remaining 23 
industries.  Damage is also fairly evenly distributed across sectors, with a few exceptions: 30% of 
plants in the Production Machinery sector experienced major damage and the same proportion 
experienced medium damage.  Thus this sector was particularly badly affected by the earthquake.  
In terms of tsunami damage, the most affected sector was Beverages, Tobacco and Feed of which 
16.2% of plants experienced major tsunami damage.  These results are indicative of a degree of 
plant level clustering for certain sectors.12 
 
2.3 Pre-Earthquake Planning 
A key feature of the RIETI survey is that it collected information on the extent to which, prior to 
the earthquake, plants had in place policies to protect their operations from the effects of a future 
earthquake or natural disaster such as a typhoon or flood event.  More specifically, plants were 
asked whether they had arranged alternative transportation methods in the event of an earthquake 
(Transport_subs_policy); whether they had made alternative production arrangements with other 
firms to enable current orders to be fulfilled (Prodn_subs_policy); whether they had an existing 
business continuity plan (BusinessContinuityPlan or BCP); and whether they had deliberately 
                                                          
12
 Shimizu and Matsubara (2014) summarise the recovery process of manufacturing industries in the Tohoku region and 
discuss the need for investment in the areas seriously damaged by the earthquake. 
8 
 
diversified parts suppliers to minimise potential disruption to the supply chain 
(DiversifiedPartsSuppliers).13 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for all of our variables, including each of these four planning 
variables.  We show that the proportion of plants that had undertaken any of the pre-quake plans 
ranges from 8.6% in the case of the adoption of a BCP to just 2.2% in the case of transport planning.  
In addition, we observe that the average firm has approximately 8 trading partners, that around 48% 
are single product firms and that 29% of firms are exporters although only around 3% have overseas 
affiliates. 
 
2.4 Post-Earthquake Aid 
A feature of the RIETI survey that we exploit in our analysis is the information on whether plants 
received post-earthquake aid and, if so, what type of aid they received.  The survey distinguishes 
between aid from banks, which typically takes the form of loans at subsidised interest rates largely in 
response to government schemes to provide support to businesses (‘Bank Aid’)14; aid that comes 
directly from the government which typically takes the form of direct cash payments or subsidised 
loans or rents (‘Govt Aid’)15; aid from friends and family (‘Friend Aid’); aid from other firms (‘Firm 
                                                          
13
 The Development Bank of Japan (2011) provides more information on firm disaster planning and BCPs following 
the Great East Japan Earthquake.  They surveyed 28 companies from May-June 2011 that were impacted by the 
earthquake.  Of these firms 55% were manufacturing, 30% were transportation and 15% were wholesalers and retailers.  
They found that 30% of firms had a BCP (training based), another 30% has a BCP but did not use or had no training 
and the final 30% had no BCP but did have some disaster planning.  Chang (2003) discusses the importance of 
transport systems to cities and how disruption is a major cause of social and economic losses.  Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 
(2014) provide a discussion of BCPs following the Great East Japan Earthquake concluding that although they served 
their purpose to some degree, BCPs had a number of weaknesses including underestimating the extent of the damage 
and insufficient staff training. 
14 Bank aid consists primarily of loans that are part of lending schemes legislated by government.  A number of these 
special lending schemes are operated by the Japan Finance Corporation, which is a public corporation owned by the 
Japanese government.  See https://www.jfc.go.jp/n/finance/search/shinsaikashitsuke.html.  In addition, there is a 
lending scheme for SMEs directly damaged by the Tohoku earthquake and Tsunami called the Emergency Guarantee 
for Restoration funded by the Japanese government.  To complement government lending schemes there is also the 
Tohoku Reconstruction Fund that was established jointly by the Development Bank of Japan and local banks in the 
Tohoku area. 
15
 Direct cash payments were part of employment adjustment funds which were aimed at maintaining employment 
levels. See Hamaguchi (2015) for more details.  More generally, we do not have information on the how the aid was 
provided (whether it was a direct payment or a subsidized loan). 
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Aid’) 16 ; aid from customers or suppliers (‘Partner Aid’) 17 ; and aid from volunteers and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which we call (‘Voluntary Aid’).  The available aid tended 
to be targeted at SMEs and primarily those that experienced direct physical damage.  For 
government special lending, loans were available for 15 years for investment and 8 years for working 
capital at discounted interest rates or even with a 0% interest rate if the plant was totally destroyed.  
To qualify for the Emergency Guarantee for Restoration funds, firms had to demonstrate their level 
of damage via the provision of a certificate of damage.  In addition, there was an employment fund 
that targeted damaged firms with money given to employees who had to leave work because of the 
earthquake and who were living in the damage area.  Table 3 shows that the proportion of plants 
receiving aid ranged from the 1.3% who received Voluntary Aid to 15% who received Bank Aid.  
Partner aid appeares to be significant with 12% of firms receiving aid of this type whilst just over 
9% of firms received direct government aid. 
In Table 4 we show the proportion of plants receiving aid by damage type and level.  Observe, for 
example, that 44% of plants that experienced major earthquake damage were recipients of Bank Aid 
while 29.4% were recipients of direct Govt Aid.  In the case of tsunami damage over half of the 
plants that experienced major tsunami damage were recipients of Bank Aid, Govt Aid and Partner 
Aid.  Since each column sums to more than 100 we can infer, not surprisingly, that plants often 
received more than one type of aid. 
For the case of Bank Aid and Govt Aid, the criteria for receiving aid was entirely based around the 
extent to which the plant was directly damaged or otherwise affected by the earthquake and/or 
tsunami.  While in most cases the impact experienced by plants was in the form of direct damage, 
some plants were not directly damaged but were adversely affected by damage in the surrounding 
                                                          
16 Many firms in non-damaged areas provided damaged firms with their technology, know-how, machines, equipment 
and employees without charge.  Some firms financially supported entrepreneurs and new business that were started in 
damaged areas.  The Security Encouragement Fund, which collected money from individuals by Music Securities, 
provided funds to some local SME in damaged areas.  Takaura (2013) studies how 225 Japanese companies listed on 
the Nikkei Stock Average Index socially contributed to damaged areas and damaged firms.  UNCRD (2012) describes a 
number of case studies that describe how local firms survived and recovered from the earthquake and how they 
contributed to the reconstruction of their local communities and how they helped other local firms. 
17 Partner aid includes aid from firms (in the same sector) and includes for example (1) the lease or provision of idle 
machineries and equipment; (2) the transfer of technology, advice, management, know-how, skill, (3) the provision of 
their products and services to damaged firms (or good sold more cheaply), (4) buying the products of damaged firms 
(mainly foods and consumption goods) and (5) to provide support for new business. Todo et al.(2013) provide examples 
of firms allowing transaction partners to use their plant and machinery in order to fulfil orders and to maintain supply 
chains. 
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area, damage to infrastructure and/or damage to suppliers/customers.  Indeed, the final column of 
Table 5 provides the proportion of plants that experienced no direct earthquake or tsunami damage 
that still received some aid.  We can see, for example, that 3.9% of undamaged plants still received 
Bank Aid and 2.7% received Partner Aid.  Remember that to claim aid an independent certification 
of damage was required which mitigates against the concern that firms who self-reported their 
damage would have an incentive to over-estimate the damage to allow them to access various aid 
packages. 
Yaguchi (2014, Ch.5) presents a number of case studies on the aid from manufacturing and service 
firms and establishments.   For example, Toyota has many parts and components suppliers and 
subsidiaries in Tohoku area, and by keeping or increasing the employment levels in those 
subsidiaries in the Tohoku area, Toyota contributed to increased levels of employment in the 
Tohoku area.  In July 2012, Toyota established a new subsidiary company called the “Toyota 
Motor East Japan” which was created by merging three automobile companies with a new 
headquarters in the Miyagi prefecture (Tohoku area).  Toyota also increased the local contents in 
parts and components inside the Tohoku area.  Finally, in April 2013 Toyota opened the Toyota 
School in Miyagi prefecture which is an engineering school and job training centre aimed at 
developing new technologies in an attempt to create an automobile industrial cluster in Tohoku.  
Yaguchi (2014, Ch.6) also describes how some local firms in Tohoku managed to maintain 
employment levels and provide aid to other firms. 
 
3 Methodology 
In order to examine the effect of pre-disaster planning and post-disaster aid on plants’ post-disaster 
performance we begin by estimating equation (1): 
STOPi = α0 + α1PLANi + α2Di + α3Xi + εi   (1) 
where STOPi is the number of days for which plant-level operations stopped as a result of the 
earthquake and/or tsunami for each plant i, PLANi is a vector of variables capturing pre-disaster 
planning, Di is a vector of variables capturing earthquake and tsunami damage and Xi is a vector of 
other control variables.  Since Todo et al. (2014) indicate that supply chain networks can increase 
11 
 
plants’ resilience to disasters, vector X includes the number of trading partners for each plant.  It 
also includes a variable to measure whether or not plants produce a single product or multiple 
products under the hypothesis that producing multiple products could increase a plant’s disaster 
resilience.  Vector X also includes whether or not plants have foreign affiliates which could 
potentially insulate the firm to some extent from perturbations to the domestic market (in terms of 
the local supply chain and final goods market).18  Finally, to control for sector specific effects we 
include 25 sector dummies.  Since the dependent variable (STOP) is a count variable we estimate 
equation (1) using negative binomial estimation with robust standard errors.19 
Whilst a useful measure of the negative impact of a shock such as an earthquake, the number of days 
of stopped operations is still a very short term measure of the earthquake’s impact.  The average 
number of days of stopped operations was 16 (from Table 4) and 90% of plants experienced fewer 
than 30 days of stopped operations.  Given the administrative processes that firms had to go 
through to obtain any form of aid it is likely that many types of aid would not have reached plants 
within this short period.  Hence, we do not include the aid variables within equation (1).20 
The second part of our analysis examines the medium term impact of the earthquake and the extent 
to which pre-disaster policy and post disaster aid affected post-earthquake plant-level sales.  We 
estimate equation (2): 
SALESit = α0 + α1SALESit-1 + α2PLANi + α3AIDi + α4Di + α5Xi + εi  (2) 
where SALESit are the log of total sales of plant i for the period April to September 2011, SALESit-1 
are the log of total sales over the period April to September 2010 and AIDi is a vector of variables 
capturing post-disaster aid.  Other variables are as previously defined.  Equation (2) is estimated 
using OLS with robust standard errors. 
Finally, note that equations (1) and (2) also include terms capturing the interaction between 
pre-earthquake planning variables and both earthquake and tsunami damage, and between the aid 
variables and earthquake and tsunami damage.  To keep the number of interaction terms 
                                                          
18
 The questionnaire asks about “production by your foreign establishments/affiliates” irrespective of the percentage of 
ownership by the Japanese plant. 
19 A Poisson model is not appropriate in our case as our data are over-dispersed.  However, the results were 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  Results are available from the author upon request. 
20 In unreported estimations we do include the aid variables and find them all to be statistically insignificant. 
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manageable rather than using individual dummy variables for each level of earthquake and tsunami 
damage, we utilise a single damage index to capture earthquake damage and an equivalent index to 
capture tsunami damage.  It should be noted that our results are consistent with those estimated 
using individual damage dummies. 
The cross-sectional nature of our analysis (albeit with sales data pre and post-earthquake) inevitably 
limits our ability to deal with endogeneity concerns.  Such concerns could arise through reverse 
causality if, for example, a firm that experienced a reduction in sales was more likely to receive aid.  
If true, then this would exert negative pressure on the estimated coefficients on aid suggesting that 
ours would be conservative estimates.  The fact that we do not find a significant negative 
relationship between any type of aid and sales, and in some cases find a positive significant 
relationship suggests that the extent of any reverse causality is limited.  Reverse causality between 
pre-earthquake planning and post-earthquake sales would appear to be less of a concern but the above 
argument would still apply.  Alternatively, endogeneity could arise if an unobserved variable 
influenced both post-earthquake sales and aid (or post-earthquake sales and pre-earthquake 
planning).  Although it is not obvious to us what such a variable could be, our cross-sectional data 
means we are unable to explore this issue further other than through our various controls including 
industry dummies.21  One final concern might be that as the survey is self-reported that the level of 
damage is in a sense “subjective” and hence correlated with unobserved firm-level characteristics 
such as manager quality, managerial risk aversion etc.  However, because, as already mentioned, 
firms needed to provide independently verified damage certifications to access various aid packages 
firms have a strong incentive to report the appropriately banded level of damage. 
A second concern about the data is that we only observe a selection of firms that survived over a 
year after the earthquake.  To the extent that the policies affect the survival of a firm, which would 
appear likely, there is concern that the coefficients will be biased.  Whilst a legitimate concern, 
Uchida et al. (2014) show that from a total of 83,612 plants in the earthquake area just 400 filed for 
bankruptcy (0.476%).  Perhaps surprisingly, the number that filed for bankruptcy that were also 
damaged in the quake was only 122 (0.405%) perhaps as a result of the aid provided to damaged 
firms and hence one of the reasons for this study.  Given that the Uchinda et al. (2014) sample 
                                                          
21
 Possible unobservable correlates may include commercial forms of aid being related to how “well-connected” a plant 
is with other palnts or firms or how important a plant is to its partners/suppliers.  If this was the case then it is 
important to note that our aid results may be picking up these features. 
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includes a large number of small and medium sized enterprises whereas our sample tends to be 
larger firms we are confident that the selection bias is likely to be very small if it exists at all.  In a 
similar study of financial shocks and natural disasters Uchinda (2015) on a smaller sample of 53,905 
firms finds bankruptcy rates shortly after the earthquake of 0.349% and 0.5.55% for damaged and 
undamaged firms respectively. 
 
4. Results 
Table 5 provides estimates of the number of days of stopped operations from equation (1).  As 
expected, models (1) to (7) clearly show that earthquake damage and tsunami damage are positive 
and significant determinants of the number of days of stopped operations.  The numbers reported 
in Table 6 are incident rate ratios.  Taking model (1) as an example, this means that if Quake 
Damage increased by 1 unit, the number of days of stopped operations would increase by a factor of 
1.47.  The equivalent figure for Tsunami Damage is 2.18 indicating that, on average, Tsunami 
damage had a greater impact on the duration of stopped operations than did earthquake damage. 
In models (1) to (5) the pre-disaster planning variables are added individually while model (6) 
includes them all together.  In model (7) we include the interactions between all of the planning 
variables and all of the damage variables but for reasons of space we only report those interaction 
terms that are statistically significant.  It is only in model (7) that any of the planning variables 
become statistically significant.  We find that having a transport substitution policy and a BCP 
reduces the days of stopped operations by a factor of 0.43 and 0.64, respectively.  The fact that 
these variables are significant despite the inclusion of interactions between the damage and the 
policy variables suggests that these two policies are benefiting undamaged plants.  One explanation 
is that the BCP variable is capturing the undamaged firms’ ability to adjust to shocks to the supply 
chain as they were able to replace inputs from damaged plants with inputs from elsewhere.  
Likewise, the transport substitution policy is capturing the ability of firms to adjust to damage to 
transport infrastructure and still get their products to market (domestically or internationally).22 
                                                          
22 Chujo et al. (2013) found that up to 10% of their sample of firms suffered stoppages due to supply chain problems 
following the Great East Japan earthquake.  In addition they found that reducing the physical length of the supply 
chain reduced the stoppages time.  The sectors most affected by supply chain issues were the automotive and food 
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When we consider the significant interaction terms we find that earthquake damaged plants that had 
a production substitution policy had more days of stopped operations (a coefficient greater than 1).  
One explanation is that this reflects a reduced pressure to resume operations for plants with such a 
policy.  One argument is that production is shifted to an undamaged plant within the structure of 
the firm thus allowing the damaged plant to be rebuilt or repaired to a potentially higher 
specification or it is repurposed to produce other goods or a smaller quantity of the existing goods 
using alternative machine tooling or production line technologies which takes longer to install.  As 
we see later, given that the interaction between quake damage (or tsunami damage) and the 
substitution policy does not have a significantly negative impact on sales suggests that the 
substitution away from the damaged plant was temporary.  However, we still find that for the full 
sample (no interaction terms) that the production substitution variable without interaction terms is 
significant and negative when we consider medium terms sales as our dependent variable.  This 
suggests that some undamaged plants moved production perhaps due to damage to infrastructure in 
the local area around their plants.23  Finally, tsunami damaged plants that had BCPs in place 
experienced fewer days of stopped operations where stopped operations were found to be reduced 
by a factor of 0.71. 
 
Finally, in terms of the other control variables included in models (1) to (7), the results show that 
only the presence of overseas affiliates is statistically significant.  Plants that have such affiliates 
experienced a reduction in stoppages by a factor of 0.65 to 0.66.  This suggests that plants with 
affiliates are more resilient to natural disasters and perhaps reflects the fact that such plants are less 
dependent on the disrupted local market and potentially local suppliers that may have been damaged 
in the earthquake.  It is worth noting at this point that we also included the aid variables in 
equation (1) as one might expect that the receipt of aid could have reduced the time the plant was 
not in operation.  However, none of the aid variables were significant.  This is perhaps not 
surprising given that the mean stoppage time for plants was just over 16 days and likely delays from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sectors.  Hamaguchi (2013) also comments on how network-intensive sectors were particularly hard hit especially the 
automotive sector which requires large numbers of parts and components. 
23
 One endogeneity concern would be that firms perceived to be more vulnerable to a natural disaster would be more 
likely to have a production substitution plan. 
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the day of the earthquake to the granting of aid and the delay from the granting of aid to the actual 
receipt of aid.  Results are available upon request. 
We now consider the impact of the earthquake and tsunami on the sales of plants in the period 
immediately following the disaster.  Table 6 provides our estimates of equation (2) in which the 
dependent variable is the log of post-earthquake sales.  Model (1) includes our damage indices and 
basic controls, model (2) introduces the pre-disaster planning variables, model (3) includes the 
post-disaster aid variables, model (4) includes both planning and aid variables, model (5) includes 
interactions between the aid and damage variables and finally model (6) includes interactions 
between the planning and damage variables.  Following on from the presentation of Table 5, Table 
6 also only report statistically significant interactions terms. 
 
With regard to the damage variables we find that earthquake damage is not a statistically significant 
determinant of post-earthquake sales.  However, tsunami damage is statistically significant and 
negative in 5 out of our 6 models.  The magnitude of the coefficients are between -0.41 and -0.44 
which tells us that a 1 unit increase in the tsunami damage index results in a reduction of 
post-earthquake sales of between 33.6% and 35.6%.24  Given that the average number of stoppage 
days was 16 it is not surprising that, on average, post-earthquake sales for damaged plants were not 
significantly different to undamaged plants as damaged plants could still make up for the lost 
production during the stoppage period by increasing production over the course of the year (longer 
working days etc.). 
Turning to the planning variables, in model (4) we find that plants with a transport substitution 
policy experienced increased sales while those with a production substitution policy experienced a 
reduction in sales.  This latter result is consistent with our results in Table 5 and suggests that 
production is shifted elsewhere presumably partner plants (at least for the time period of our study).  
Likewise, having a transport substitution policy is positive for sales when we look at all plants 
(damaged and undamaged).  When interactions between the planning variables and the damage 
variables are included in model (6) we find that earthquake damaged plants with transport 
                                                          
24 When the estimated coefficient on tsunami damage is -0.41 the effect of tsunami damage on sales is calculated as exp 
(-0.41)-1 = 0.336. 
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substitution policies experienced increased sales in comparison to earthquake damaged plants 
without such a policy.  Model (6) also shows that earthquake damaged plants with BCPs and 
tsunami damaged plants with diversified-parts suppliers, also experienced increased sales.  In terms 
of magnitude, taking the example of diversified parts suppliers, we find that a one unit increase in 
tsunami damage reduced sales by 8.6% for plants with diversified parts suppliers compared to a 
reduction of 34.9% for tsunami damaged plants without such a policy where this variable captures 
the number of suppliers rather than geographical diversification.25  One explanation is that there 
may have been an element of creative destruction whereby plants that were shown to be damaged in 
the quake were able to attract new business and contracts from partner firms and government 
procurement contracts that were put in place specifically to help earthquake damaged plants in the 
year following the quake.  These results support the results of Uchida et al. (2014) who find lower 
bankruptcy rates for damaged plants compared to undamaged plants in the year following the 
earthquake.  It is interesting to note that the production substitution policy interacted with 
earthquake damage is negative but insignificant (-0.88 coefficient).  This suggests that the 
substitution of production between plants was temporary. 
Turning to the aid variables, models (3), (4) and (6) indicate that bank aid and partner aid are 
statistically significant and positive determinants of post-earthquake sales.  Depending on the 
model, recipients of bank aid experienced an increase in sales of between 11.6% and 13.9%, relative 
to those that received no aid.  Equivalent figures for partner aid are between 20.9% and 23.3%.  
Model (5), which includes interactions between the damage variables and the aid variables, reveals 
that it is tsunami damaged recipients of bank and partner aid that experienced a statistically 
significant increase in sales.  As trade partners are likely to be part of the same supply chain they 
would have a strong incentive to ensure that sales are maintained.  Recall also that bank aid 
included government backed loans so can still be considered government aid although directed 
trough the existing bank network.  Reassuringly, none of the aid variables were statistically 
                                                          
25 The marginal effect of tsunami damage in the presence of diversified parts suppliers (from model 6) is calculated as 
exp(-0.43 + (0.34 * diversified parts supplier dummy))-1 = -0.086.  Because the coefficients on the earthquake damage 
variable are insignificant, we do not report the results for a similar exercise for the quake interaction terms in the main 
text.  However, the interpretation for the transport substitution variable would be that the marginal effect of 
earthquake damage in the presence of a transport substitution policy (from model 6) is calculated as exp(0.048 + 
(0.67*transport substitution policy dummy))-1) = 2.15 compared to a small increase in sales of 4.9% for damaged plants 
without a transport substitution policy in place.  However, we must remember that the earthquake coefficients are not 
statistically significant from zero so we must interpret these marginal effects with caution. 
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significant determinants of sales for undamaged plants.26  An interpretation of the results is that a 
one unit increase in tsunami damage reduced sales by 14% for recipients of bank aid, and by 47% 
for recipients of partner aid, compared to a reduction in sales of 52.3% for tsunami damaged plants 
that did not receive either type of aid.27 
Our results raise the important question of why other types of aid did not positively impact sales.  
There are a number of possible explanations.  First, following the tsunami the government put a 
considerable funding into land projects which took time to implement leading to a delay in funding 
plant rebuilding.  For example, Hamaguchi (2013) gives the example of the fishiery sector.  
Although large amounts of aid were provided to rebuild the ports and market infrastructure little 
was provided to the fishermen themselves and hence recovery was particularly slow in this sector.  
In addition, direct government aid was provided to support continued employment in the tsunami 
affected area even if this employment level was not consistent with the plant capacity to produce 
output at the same level as before.  Anecdotally, a proportion of the subsidies provided to small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) were still not allocated even one year after the quake.  As 
disucussed above, the food sector was particularly affected by these delays.28 
Uesugi et al. (2014) consider the aid problem in terms of type 1, type 2 and type 3 errors.  In 
addition to the type 1 problem of high quality firms not getting appropriate funding is a type 2 
problem of loans being provided to low quality firms that should not have received them in the first 
place.  In this case it is less suprising that the aid support does not have a positive impact on sales.  
Uesugi et al. (2014) find that the share of firms facing type 1 and type 2 errors is similar between 
damaged and undamaged firms.  They also discuss type 3 problems of damaged firms suffering from 
the problem of overlapping debt where additional loans to aid recovery add to an already considerable 
debt burden which further hampers recovery. 
                                                          
26 This is despite the fact that 3.9% of bank aid recipients and 2.7% of partner aid recipients were not damaged directly 
by the earthquake and tsunami (from Table 4). 
27 Calculated as exp(-0.75 + (0.60*bank aid dummy))-1 = -0.14 and exp(-0.75 + (0.12*partner aid dummy))-1 = -0.47. 
Note that the coefficient on the tsunami damage index (of -0.75) is not statistically significant in model 5 and so these 
estimates should be treated with caution (similarly to the quake results discussion in footnote 19). 
28
 Aoki (2016) argues that Japan’s semi-structured disaster governance may have been paralyzed at the municipal level 
by shortages of labour at government offices and related third sector organizations.  This was despite over 1.4 million 
volunteers who travelled to help the communities in the Tohoku region (Japan National Council of Social Welfare, 
2015). 
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Finally, of the other control variables reported in Table 6 pre-earthquake sales are a positive and 
strongly significant determinant of post-earthquake sales and the number of trading partners is 
positive and weakly significant (at 10%) in some models.  This latter result suggests that, other 
things being equal, a greater number of trading partners may provide some resilience to the 
economic shocks from a natural disaster and is consistent with the findings of Todo et al. (2014). 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the impact of pre-disaster planning and post-disaster aid on the 
performance of plants that were in the region affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.  
Our results show that, unsurprisingly, both the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami had a 
significant and positive effect on the length of time that firms’ operations ceased, with tsunami 
damaged plants taking longer to recover.  However, when we consider the sales in the six months 
following the earthquake we find that only tsunami damage has a negative effect.  Indeed, we find 
that plants that had in place a BCP recovered more quickly than plants without such a plan.  
Perhaps less intuitive at first glance is that we find that plants that have a production substitution 
policy take longer to restart operations.  One intuitive explanation is that production was shifted 
temporarily elsewhere allowing the firm the flexibility to repair damaged building perhaps to a higher 
specification which may explain the resilience of the region in the medium to long term. 
In terms of the aid variables our results suggest that bank aid and partner aid were the more 
important forms of aid for post-quake sales, especially so for tsunami damaged plants whereas other 
forms of aid, including direct government payments appear to have had a negligible effect.  
However, it is worth noting that bank aid was largely administered on behalf of the government so 
may be capturing the effect of government aid indirectly.  Our results are consistent with Uchinda 
et al. (2014) and Uchinda et al. (2015) who suggest that the provision of public and private aid to 
damaged firms was one of the reasons why the bankruptcy rate of damaged firms was actually lower 
than that of undamaged firms.  The large aid packages provided to plants in the earthquake 
affected area often provided these plants with a competitive advantage relate to plants elsewhere in 
Japan competing in the same sector.  Understandably, plants in other areas of Japan were unlikely 
to complain given the overall devastation caused by the earthquake.  This may partially explain why 
our earthquake damage index did not have a negative and significant effect on post-earthquake sales.  
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What is clear is that there is a complex relationship between pre-quake policies and post-quake aid 
provision. 
Although our results provide a rather mixed story it is possible to draw out a number of policy 
implications.  Our results suggest that plants should put in place BCPs and also firms with multiple 
plants should plan to switch production in the case of a future natural disaster.  For policymakers it 
appears that directing aid through the local banking system has the largest benefits and that 
indirectly, encouraging firms to build relationships with foreign affiliates can help to secure supply 
chains allowing a faster recovery in terms of sales.  It is also important for countries to develop a 
system of adaptive governance to improve the governance dynamics in an area of disaster 
management.  In future work we would like to explore further the mechanisms by which different 
policies and sources of aid affect firm behaviour and to link this more closely with labour and 
employment outcomes. 
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Figure 1. Map of Northern Japan Showing Earthquake Damage and Epicenter and the Location of 
Plants in Our Sample 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Black dots indicate plants in our sample, (2) Dark blue area on the coast is Tsunami flooded area; 
(3) Color shading – from red (1.2+), orange(0.3-1.2) until yellow (0.2-) – indicate degree of decreasing peak 
ground acceleration (%g).  
 
Figure 2. Close up of Part of Affected Area 
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Notes: (1) Black dots indicate plants in our sample, (2) Dark blue area on the coast is Tsunami flooded area; 
(3) Color shading – from red (1.2+), orange(0.3-1.2) until yellow (0.2-) – indicate degree of decreasing peak 
ground acceleration (%g). 
 
 
Table 1. Earthquake and Tsunami Damage in Our Sample 
 Number of Plants  
in our Sample 
% of Plants in our  
Sample 
Major Earthquake Damage 20 1.55 
Medium Earthquake Damage 86 6.69 
Minor Earthquake Damage 811 63.2 
No Earthquake Damage 366 28.6 
Major Tsunami Damage 44 3.4 
Medium Tsunami Damage 15 1.2 
Minor Tsunami Damage 15 1.2 
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No Tsunami Damage 1210 94.3 
 
 
 
Table 2. Composition of Sample and Damage by Sector 
Sector  
No. 
plant
s 
% 
plant
s 
Major 
Quake 
Damage
* 
Medium 
Quake 
Damage
* 
Minor 
Quake 
Damage
* 
Major 
Tsunami 
Damage* 
Medium 
Tsunami 
Damage
* 
Minor 
Tsunami 
Damage* 
Food 164 12.8 2.4 8.5 60 4.2 1.2 1.2 
Beverages, tobacco 
& feed 37 2.9 2.7 5.4 51 16.2 5.4 2.7 
Textile mill 
products 27 2.1 3.7 11.1 67 0 0 0 
Lumber and wood 
products 61 4.8 1.6 4.9 54 8.2 0 1.6 
Furniture and 
fixtures 7 0.6 0 0 57 0 0 0 
Pulp, paper & 
products 27 2.1 0 11 52 3.7 0 3.7 
Printing 91 7.1 1.1 14 63 2.2 1.1 2.2 
Chemical products 15 1.2 0 0 93 0 0 0 
Petroleum and coal 
products 3 0.2 0 0 67 0 0 0 
Plastic products 65 5.1 0 6.2 74 1.5 0 0 
Rubber products 8 0.6 0 13 75 0 0 0 
Leather products 1 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ceramic, stone and 
clay products 100 7.8 3 5 50 1 2 0 
Iron and steel 25 2.0 0 4 68 0 0 4 
Non-ferrous metals 25 2.0 4 12 68 0 0 0 
Fabricated metals 
products 165 12.9 1.2 4.2 72 4.8 1.2 0.61 
General purpose 
machinery 8 0.6 0 0 37.5 0 0 13 
Production 
machinery 67 5.2 30 30 64 3 1.5 0 
Business oriented 
machinery 25 2.0 0 8 40 4 0 0 
Electronics 25 2.0 0 16 56 0 0 0 
Electrical 
machinery 115 8.9 1.7 6.1 69 1.7 0.87 2.6 
IT equipment 12 0.9 0 17 67 0 0 0 
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Transport 
equipment 49 3.8 2 4.1 57 6.1 0 2 
Misc. equipment 134 10.4 0 5.2 68 3 1.5 0.74 
Non-manufacturing 27 2.1 3.7 3.7 67 3.7 7.4 0 
* the % of plants in each sector that suffered that level of damage. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Quake Damage 0.81 0.63 0 3 
Tsunami Damage 0.15 0.62 0 3 
Days of stopped operations 16.08 28.48 0 300 
Sales (post-quake) (10,000 Yen) 81910 1644011 32 1,505,142 
Sales (pre-quake) (10,000 Yen) 80782 1507183 19 1,970,500 
single_product  0.48 0.50 0 1 
export_dum 0.29 0.45 0 1 
overseas_dum 0.03 0.16 0 1 
NumTradingPartners 8.23 5.58 1 35 
Transport_subs_policy  0.022 0.15 0 1 
Prodn_subs_policy  0.032 0.18 0 1 
BusinessContinuityPlan 0.086 0.28 0 1 
DiversifiedPartsSuppliers  0.051 0.22 0 1 
Bank Aid 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Govt Aid:  0.091 0.29 0 1 
Friend Aid 0.033 0.18 0 1 
Firm Aid 0.052 0.22 0 1 
Partner Aid 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Voluntary Aid 0.013 0.11 0 1 
 
Table 4. The Percentage of Plants Receiving Aid by Damage Level and Type 
 Earthquake Damage Tsunami Damage No tsunami 
or earthquake 
damage 
  
Major* 
 
Medium 
 
Minor 
 
None 
 
Major 
 
Medium 
 
Minor 
 
None 
Bank Aid 44.1 34.6 15.9 8.6 52.7 69.6 38.1 13.0 3.9 
Govt Aid 29.4 23.1 7.8 7.3 54.1 47.8 23.8 6.6 2.3 
28 
 
Friend Aid 14.7 10.0 2.5 3.0 31.1 34.8 9.5 1.7 0 
Firm Aid 17.6 12.3 4.4 4.7 47.3 34.8 23.8 3.0 0.6 
Partner Aid 23.5 23.1 12.0 7.8 55.4 52.2 42.9 9.1 2.7 
Voluntary Aid 8.8 4.6 0.5 1.7 20.3 17.4 4.8 0.3 0 
* e.g. the percentage of plants that experienced major earthquake damage that were recipients of each type of aid. 
 
Table 5. Dependent Variable: Number of Days of Stopped Operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quake Damage 1.47*** 1.47*** 1.46*** 1.47*** 1.47*** 1.46*** 1.40*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.040) 
Tsunami Damage 2.18*** 2.19*** 2.18*** 2.18*** 2.18*** 2.18*** 2.13*** 
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.094) (0.11) 
Transport_Subs_Policy  0.84    0.73 0.43** 
  (0.15)    (0.21) (0.17) 
Prodn_Subs_Policy   1.05   1.28 0.79 
   (0.089)   (0.21) (0.15) 
BusinessContinuityPlan    0.87  0.87 0.64*** 
    (0.087)  (0.086) (0.098) 
DiversifiedPartSuppliers     0.88 0.90 1.06 
     (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) 
Prodn_subs_policy*Quake 
Damage 
      1.50* 
       (0.31) 
BusinessContinuityPlan*Tsunami 
Damage 
      0.71*** 
       (0.093) 
Sales (pre quake) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
NumTradingPartners 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Single_Product 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) 
Overseas_Dum 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.096) (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) 
Observations 913 913 913 913 913 913 913 
Notes: We report incident rate ratios from negative binomial estimations.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.  
Note that all interactions between the pre earthquake planning variables and Quake Damage and Tsunami 
Damage were included but, for reasons of space, only those that are statistically significant are reported.  
Industry dummies are included. 
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Table 6. Dependent Variable: Log of Sales (post-earthquake) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Quake Damage 0.055 0.060 0.039 0.044 0.045 0.048 
 (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.065) (0.032) 
Tsunami Damage -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.44** -0.44** -0.75 -0.43*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.48) (0.15) 
Transport_Subs_Policy  0.41  0.46** 0.52** -0.020 
  (0.24)  (0.20) (0.22) (0.68) 
Prodn_Subs_Policy  -0.51  -0.52* -0.49 0.081 
  (0.31)  (0.30) (0.31) (0.95) 
BusinessContinuityPlan  0.028  0.023 0.045 -0.17 
  (0.091)  (0.086) (0.074) (0.13) 
DiversifiedPartSuppliers  0.032  0.023 -0.0044 0.18 
  (0.048)  (0.042) (0.050) (0.11) 
Bank Aid   0.13** 0.12** 0.023 0.11* 
   (0.057) (0.054) (0.18) (0.059) 
Govt Aid   -0.18 -0.19 0.058 -0.16 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.28) (0.11) 
Friend Aid   -0.020 -0.038 -0.24 -0.079 
   (0.25) (0.25) (0.34) (0.27) 
Firm Aid   0.11 0.13 -0.15 0.079 
   (0.18) (0.19) (0.29) (0.18) 
Partner Aid   0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18 0.21*** 
   (0.050) (0.050) (0.20) (0.061) 
Voluntary Aid   -0.14 -0.19 -0.22 -0.36 
   (0.74) (0.72) (0.51) (0.65) 
 
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 6 continued. Dependent Variable: Sales (post-quake) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank Aid*Tsunami     0.60**  
     (0.3)  
Partner Aid*Tsunami     0.12**  
     (0.06)  
Transport_Subs_Policy*Quake 
Damage 
     0.67*** 
      (0.22) 
Prodn_Subs_Policy*Quake 
Damage 
     -0.88 
      (1.07) 
BusinessContinuityPlan*Quake 
Damage 
     0.27* 
      (0.16) 
DiversifiedPartSuppliers*Tsunami 
Damage 
     0.34*** 
      (0.14) 
Log of Sales (pre quake) 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
NumTradingPartners 0.11 0.11* 0.11 0.10 0.11* 0.11 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.070) (0.066) (0.062) (0.067) 
Single_Product -0.031 -0.025 -0.020 -0.014 -0.016 -0.0072 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050) 
Overseas_Dum -0.0014 0.0061 -0.014 -0.0039 -0.014 -0.026 
 (0.074) (0.082) (0.067) (0.071) (0.079) (0.084) 
Observations 1,283 1,283 1,283 1,283 1,283 1,283 
R-squared 0.722 0.724 0.725 0.727 0.738 0.734 
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimations.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
Note that all interactions between the pre earthquake planning variables and Quake Damage and Tsunami 
Damage were included as well as all interactions between the aid variables and Quake Damage and Tsunami 
Damage but, for reasons of space, only those that are statistically significant are reported.  Industry dummies 
are included 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable definitions 
Days of stopped operations Number of days for which the plant’s operations ceased 
Sales (post-quake) Sales for the period April to September 2011 
Sales (pre-quake) Sales for the period April to September 2010 
Quake Damage A single variable measuring earthquake damage on a scale of 0 to 3, where 0 
is no damage, 1 is minor damage, 2 is more severe partial damage (medium 
damage) and 3 is major damage 
Tsunami Damage A single variable measuring earthquake damage on a scale of 0 to 3, where 0 
is no damage, 1 is minor damage, 2 is more severe partial damage (medium 
damage) and 3 is major damage 
single_product A dummy variable for plants that produce one product only 
export_dum A dummy variable for plants that export 
overseas_dum A dummy variables for plants with overseas affiliates 
NumTradingPartners The total number of trading partners for each plant 
Transport_subs_policy A dummy variable for plants that undertook pre-quake planning for an 
alternative transportation method for the plant’s products in the event of a 
natural disaster 
Prodn_subs_policy A dummy variable for plants that undertook pre-quake planning for 
alternative production arrangements with other plants in Japan in the event 
of a natural disaster 
BusinessContinuityPlan A dummy variable for plants that had a pre-existing business continuity 
plan (BCP) 
DiversifiedPartsSuppliers A dummy variable for plants that had deliberately diversified their parts and 
component suppliers pre-natural disaster (number of suppliers) 
Bank_aid A dummy variable for plants that received financial aid from banks 
following the earthquake following the earthquake 
govt_aid A dummy variable for plants that received aid from government, local 
government or public bodies following the earthquake 
friend_aid A dummy variable for plants that received aid from friends and relatives 
following the earthquake 
firm_aid A dummy variable for plants that received aid from other firms in the same 
industry following the earthquake 
partner_aid A dummy variable for plants that received aid from trading partners 
following the earthquake 
vol_aid A dummy variable for plants that received aid from volunteer workers 
following the earthquake 
Source: RIETI special survey, except the NumTradingPartners which is from Tokyo Shoko Research. 
